sshd [-46DdeiqTt] [-b bits] [-C connection_spec]
          [-c host_certificate_file] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]
          [-h host_key_file] [-k key_gen_time] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]

     sshd (OpenSSH Daemon) is the daemon program for ssh(1).  Together these
     programs replace rlogin(1) and rsh(1), and provide secure encrypted com-
     munications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network.

     sshd listens for connections from clients.  It is normally started at
     boot from /etc/init/ssh.conf.  It forks a new daemon for each incoming
     connection.  The forked daemons handle key exchange, encryption, authen-
     tication, command execution, and data exchange.

     sshd can be configured using command-line options or a configuration file
     (by default sshd_config(5)); command-line options override values speci-
     fied in the configuration file.  sshd rereads its configuration file when
     it receives a hangup signal, SIGHUP, by executing itself with the name
     and options it was started with, e.g. /usr/sbin/sshd.

     The options are as follows:

     -4      Forces sshd to use IPv4 addresses only.

     -6      Forces sshd to use IPv6 addresses only.

     -b bits
             Specifies the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1
             server key (default 1024).

     -C connection_spec
             Specify the connection parameters to use for the -T extended test
             mode.  If provided, any Match directives in the configuration
             file that would apply to the specified user, host, and address
             will be set before the configuration is written to standard out-
             put.  The connection parameters are supplied as keyword=value
             pairs.  The keywords are ``user'', ``host'', and ``addr''.  All
             are required and may be supplied in any order, either with multi-
             ple -C options or as a comma-separated list.

     -c host_certificate_file
             Specifies a path to a certificate file to identify sshd during
             key exchange.  The certificate file must match a host key file
             specified using the -h option or the HostKey configuration direc-

     -D      When this option is specified, sshd will not detach and does not
             become a daemon.  This allows easy monitoring of sshd.

     -d      Debug mode.  The server sends verbose debug output to standard
             error, and does not put itself in the background.  The server
             also will not fork and will only process one connection.  This
             option is only intended for debugging for the server.  Multiple
             -d options increase the debugging level.  Maximum is 3.
             user within this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits.
             A value of zero indicates no limit.

     -h host_key_file
             Specifies a file from which a host key is read.  This option must
             be given if sshd is not run as root (as the normal host key files
             are normally not readable by anyone but root).  The default is
             /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key for protocol version 1, and
             /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key and
             /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key for protocol version 2.  It is possible
             to have multiple host key files for the different protocol ver-
             sions and host key algorithms.

     -i      Specifies that sshd is being run from inetd(8).  sshd is normally
             not run from inetd because it needs to generate the server key
             before it can respond to the client, and this may take tens of
             seconds.  Clients would have to wait too long if the key was
             regenerated every time.  However, with small key sizes (e.g. 512)
             using sshd from inetd may be feasible.

     -k key_gen_time
             Specifies how often the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key
             is regenerated (default 3600 seconds, or one hour).  The motiva-
             tion for regenerating the key fairly often is that the key is not
             stored anywhere, and after about an hour it becomes impossible to
             recover the key for decrypting intercepted communications even if
             the machine is cracked into or physically seized.  A value of
             zero indicates that the key will never be regenerated.

     -o option
             Can be used to give options in the format used in the configura-
             tion file.  This is useful for specifying options for which there
             is no separate command-line flag.  For full details of the
             options, and their values, see sshd_config(5).

     -p port
             Specifies the port on which the server listens for connections
             (default 22).  Multiple port options are permitted.  Ports speci-
             fied in the configuration file with the Port option are ignored
             when a command-line port is specified.  Ports specified using the
             ListenAddress option override command-line ports.

     -q      Quiet mode.  Nothing is sent to the system log.  Normally the
             beginning, authentication, and termination of each connection is

     -T      Extended test mode.  Check the validity of the configuration
             file, output the effective configuration to stdout and then exit.
             Optionally, Match rules may be applied by specifying the connec-
             tion parameters using one or more -C options.

     -t      Test mode.  Only check the validity of the configuration file and
             sanity of the keys.  This is useful for updating sshd reliably as
             configuration options may change.
             options that require DNS include using a USER@HOST pattern in
             AllowUsers or DenyUsers.

     The OpenSSH SSH daemon supports SSH protocols 1 and 2.  The default is to
     use protocol 2 only, though this can be changed via the Protocol option
     in sshd_config(5).  Protocol 2 supports DSA, ECDSA and RSA keys; protocol
     1 only supports RSA keys.  For both protocols, each host has a host-spe-
     cific key, normally 2048 bits, used to identify the host.

     Forward security for protocol 1 is provided through an additional server
     key, normally 768 bits, generated when the server starts.  This key is
     normally regenerated every hour if it has been used, and is never stored
     on disk.  Whenever a client connects, the daemon responds with its public
     host and server keys.  The client compares the RSA host key against its
     own database to verify that it has not changed.  The client then gener-
     ates a 256-bit random number.  It encrypts this random number using both
     the host key and the server key, and sends the encrypted number to the
     server.  Both sides then use this random number as a session key which is
     used to encrypt all further communications in the session.  The rest of
     the session is encrypted using a conventional cipher, currently Blowfish
     or 3DES, with 3DES being used by default.  The client selects the encryp-
     tion algorithm to use from those offered by the server.

     For protocol 2, forward security is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key
     agreement.  This key agreement results in a shared session key.  The rest
     of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher, currently 128-bit
     AES, Blowfish, 3DES, CAST128, Arcfour, 192-bit AES, or 256-bit AES.  The
     client selects the encryption algorithm to use from those offered by the
     server.  Additionally, session integrity is provided through a crypto-
     graphic message authentication code (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64, hmac-
     ripemd160, hmac-sha2-256 or hmac-sha2-512).

     Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.  The
     client tries to authenticate itself using host-based authentication, pub-
     lic key authentication, challenge-response authentication, or password

     Regardless of the authentication type, the account is checked to ensure
     that it is accessible.  An account is not accessible if it is locked,
     listed in DenyUsers or its group is listed in DenyGroups .  The defini-
     tion of a locked account is system dependant. Some platforms have their
     own account database (eg AIX) and some modify the passwd field ( '*LK*'
     on Solaris and UnixWare, '*' on HP-UX, containing 'Nologin' on Tru64, a
     leading '*LOCKED*' on FreeBSD and a leading '!' on most Linuxes).  If
     there is a requirement to disable password authentication for the account
     while allowing still public-key, then the passwd field should be set to
     something other than these values (eg 'NP' or '*NP*' ).

     If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for preparing
     the session is entered.  At this time the client may request things like
     allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections, forwarding TCP con-
     nections, or forwarding the authentication agent connection over the
     secure channel.

           1.   If the login is on a tty, and no command has been specified,
                prints last login time and /etc/motd (unless prevented in the
                configuration file or by ~/.hushlogin; see the FILES section).

           2.   If the login is on a tty, records login time.

           3.   Checks /etc/nologin; if it exists, prints contents and quits
                (unless root).

           4.   Changes to run with normal user privileges.

           5.   Sets up basic environment.

           6.   Reads the file ~/.ssh/environment, if it exists, and users are
                allowed to change their environment.  See the
                PermitUserEnvironment option in sshd_config(5).

           7.   Changes to user's home directory.

           8.   If ~/.ssh/rc exists, runs it; else if /etc/ssh/sshrc exists,
                runs it; otherwise runs xauth.  The ``rc'' files are given the
                X11 authentication protocol and cookie in standard input.  See
                SSHRC, below.

           9.   Runs user's shell or command.

     If the file ~/.ssh/rc exists, sh(1) runs it after reading the environment
     files but before starting the user's shell or command.  It must not pro-
     duce any output on stdout; stderr must be used instead.  If X11 forward-
     ing is in use, it will receive the "proto cookie" pair in its standard
     input (and DISPLAY in its environment).  The script must call xauth(1)
     because sshd will not run xauth automatically to add X11 cookies.

     The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines
     which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes accessible;
     AFS is a particular example of such an environment.

     This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by
     something similar to:

        if read proto cookie && [ -n "$DISPLAY" ]; then
                if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then
                        # X11UseLocalhost=yes
                        echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY |
                            cut -c11-` $proto $cookie
                        # X11UseLocalhost=no
                        echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie
                fi | xauth -q -

     If this file does not exist, /etc/ssh/sshrc is run, and if that does not
     starts with a number).  The bits, exponent, modulus, and comment fields
     give the RSA key for protocol version 1; the comment field is not used
     for anything (but may be convenient for the user to identify the key).
     For protocol version 2 the keytype is ``ecdsa-sha2-nistp256'',
     ``ecdsa-sha2-nistp384'', ``ecdsa-sha2-nistp521'', ``ssh-dss'' or

     Note that lines in this file are usually several hundred bytes long
     (because of the size of the public key encoding) up to a limit of 8 kilo-
     bytes, which permits DSA keys up to 8 kilobits and RSA keys up to 16
     kilobits.  You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the,,, or the file and edit

     sshd enforces a minimum RSA key modulus size for protocol 1 and protocol
     2 keys of 768 bits.

     The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option specifica-
     tions.  No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes.  The fol-
     lowing option specifications are supported (note that option keywords are

             Specifies that the listed key is a certification authority (CA)
             that is trusted to validate signed certificates for user authen-

             Certificates may encode access restrictions similar to these key
             options.  If both certificate restrictions and key options are
             present, the most restrictive union of the two is applied.

             Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used
             for authentication.  The command supplied by the user (if any) is
             ignored.  The command is run on a pty if the client requests a
             pty; otherwise it is run without a tty.  If an 8-bit clean chan-
             nel is required, one must not request a pty or should specify
             no-pty.  A quote may be included in the command by quoting it
             with a backslash.  This option might be useful to restrict cer-
             tain public keys to perform just a specific operation.  An exam-
             ple might be a key that permits remote backups but nothing else.
             Note that the client may specify TCP and/or X11 forwarding unless
             they are explicitly prohibited.  The command originally supplied
             by the client is available in the SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environ-
             ment variable.  Note that this option applies to shell, command
             or subsystem execution.  Also note that this command may be
             superseded by either a sshd_config(5) ForceCommand directive or a
             command embedded in a certificate.

             Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when
             logging in using this key.  Environment variables set this way
             override other default environment values.  Multiple options of
             this type are permitted.  Environment processing is disabled by

             The purpose of this option is to optionally increase security:
             public key authentication by itself does not trust the network or
             name servers or anything (but the key); however, if somebody
             somehow steals the key, the key permits an intruder to log in
             from anywhere in the world.  This additional option makes using a
             stolen key more difficult (name servers and/or routers would have
             to be compromised in addition to just the key).

             Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for

             Forbids TCP forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
             Any port forward requests by the client will return an error.
             This might be used, e.g. in connection with the command option.

     no-pty  Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail).

             Disables execution of ~/.ssh/rc.

             Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
             Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error.

             Limit local ``ssh -L'' port forwarding such that it may only con-
             nect to the specified host and port.  IPv6 addresses can be spec-
             ified by enclosing the address in square brackets.  Multiple
             permitopen options may be applied separated by commas.  No pat-
             tern matching is performed on the specified hostnames, they must
             be literal domains or addresses.

             On a cert-authority line, specifies allowed principals for cer-
             tificate authentication as a comma-separated list.  At least one
             name from the list must appear in the certificate's list of prin-
             cipals for the certificate to be accepted.  This option is
             ignored for keys that are not marked as trusted certificate sign-
             ers using the cert-authority option.

             Force a tun(4) device on the server.  Without this option, the
             next available device will be used if the client requests a tun-

     An example authorized_keys file:

        # Comments allowed at start of line
        ssh-rsa AAAAB3Nza...LiPk==
        from="*,!" ssh-rsa

     added to the per-user file.

     Each line in these files contains the following fields: markers
     (optional), hostnames, bits, exponent, modulus, comment.  The fields are
     separated by spaces.

     The marker is optional, but if it is present then it must be one of
     ``@cert-authority'', to indicate that the line contains a certification
     authority (CA) key, or ``@revoked'', to indicate that the key contained
     on the line is revoked and must not ever be accepted.  Only one marker
     should be used on a key line.

     Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns ('*' and '?' act as wild-
     cards); each pattern in turn is matched against the canonical host name
     (when authenticating a client) or against the user-supplied name (when
     authenticating a server).  A pattern may also be preceded by '!' to indi-
     cate negation: if the host name matches a negated pattern, it is not
     accepted (by that line) even if it matched another pattern on the line.
     A hostname or address may optionally be enclosed within '[' and ']'
     brackets then followed by ':' and a non-standard port number.

     Alternately, hostnames may be stored in a hashed form which hides host
     names and addresses should the file's contents be disclosed.  Hashed
     hostnames start with a '|' character.  Only one hashed hostname may
     appear on a single line and none of the above negation or wildcard opera-
     tors may be applied.

     Bits, exponent, and modulus are taken directly from the RSA host key;
     they can be obtained, for example, from /etc/ssh/  The
     optional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not used.

     Lines starting with '#' and empty lines are ignored as comments.

     When performing host authentication, authentication is accepted if any
     matching line has the proper key; either one that matches exactly or, if
     the server has presented a certificate for authentication, the key of the
     certification authority that signed the certificate.  For a key to be
     trusted as a certification authority, it must use the ``@cert-authority''
     marker described above.

     The known hosts file also provides a facility to mark keys as revoked,
     for example when it is known that the associated private key has been
     stolen.  Revoked keys are specified by including the ``@revoked'' marker
     at the beginning of the key line, and are never accepted for authentica-
     tion or as certification authorities, but instead will produce a warning
     from ssh(1) when they are encountered.

     It is permissible (but not recommended) to have several lines or differ-
     ent host keys for the same names.  This will inevitably happen when short
     forms of host names from different domains are put in the file.  It is
     possible that the files contain conflicting information; authentication
     is accepted if valid information can be found from either file.

     Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters
        # A hashed hostname
        |1|JfKTdBh7rNbXkVAQCRp4OQoPfmI=|USECr3SWf1JUPsms5AqfD5QfxkM= ssh-rsa
        # A revoked key
        @revoked * ssh-rsa AAAAB5W...
        # A CA key, accepted for any host in * or *
        @cert-authority *,* ssh-rsa AAAAB5W...

             This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and
             /etc/motd, if PrintLastLog and PrintMotd, respectively, are
             enabled.  It does not suppress printing of the banner specified
             by Banner.

             This file is used for host-based authentication (see ssh(1) for
             more information).  On some machines this file may need to be
             world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS parti-
             tion, because sshd reads it as root.  Additionally, this file
             must be owned by the user, and must not have write permissions
             for anyone else.  The recommended permission for most machines is
             read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.

             This file is used in exactly the same way as .rhosts, but allows
             host-based authentication without permitting login with

             This directory is the default location for all user-specific con-
             figuration and authentication information.  There is no general
             requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory secret,
             but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the
             user, and not accessible by others.

             Lists the public keys (DSA/ECDSA/RSA) that can be used for log-
             ging in as this user.  The format of this file is described
             above.  The content of the file is not highly sensitive, but the
             recommended permissions are read/write for the user, and not
             accessible by others.

             If this file, the ~/.ssh directory, or the user's home directory
             are writable by other users, then the file could be modified or
             replaced by unauthorized users.  In this case, sshd will not
             allow it to be used unless the StrictModes option has been set to

             This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists).
             It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with
             '#'), and assignment lines of the form name=value.  The file
             should be writable only by the user; it need not be readable by
             directory becomes accessible.  This file should be writable only
             by the user, and need not be readable by anyone else.

             Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are
             defined here.  Further details are described in hosts_access(5).

             This file is for host-based authentication (see ssh(1)).  It
             should only be writable by root.

             Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group
             Exchange".  The file format is described in moduli(5).

             See motd(5).

             If this file exists, sshd refuses to let anyone except root log
             in.  The contents of the file are displayed to anyone trying to
             log in, and non-root connections are refused.  The file should be

             This file is used in exactly the same way as hosts.equiv, but
             allows host-based authentication without permitting login with

             These three files contain the private parts of the host keys.
             These files should only be owned by root, readable only by root,
             and not accessible to others.  Note that sshd does not start if
             these files are group/world-accessible.

             These three files contain the public parts of the host keys.
             These files should be world-readable but writable only by root.
             Their contents should match the respective private parts.  These
             files are not really used for anything; they are provided for the
             convenience of the user so their contents can be copied to known
             hosts files.  These files are created using ssh-keygen(1).

             Systemwide list of known host keys.  This file should be prepared
             by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of
             all machines in the organization.  The format of this file is

             chroot(2) directory used by sshd during privilege separation in
             the pre-authentication phase.  The directory should not contain
             any files and must be owned by root and not group or world-

             Contains the process ID of the sshd listening for connections (if
             there are several daemons running concurrently for different
             ports, this contains the process ID of the one started last).
             The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-read-

     scp(1), sftp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1),
     ssh-keyscan(1), ssh-vulnkey(1), chroot(2), hosts_access(5), moduli(5),
     sshd_config(5), inetd(8), sftp-server(8)

     OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
     Tatu Ylonen.  Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
     de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and cre-
     ated OpenSSH.  Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
     versions 1.5 and 2.0.  Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
     for privilege separation.

     System security is not improved unless rshd, rlogind, and rexecd are dis-
     abled (thus completely disabling rlogin and rsh into the machine).

BSD                             October 9, 2015                            BSD
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