ssl_ct_validation_cb

       SSL_CTX_ct_is_enabled - control Certificate Transparency policy

SYNOPSIS
        #include <openssl/ssl.h>

        typedef int (*ssl_ct_validation_cb)(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx,
                                           const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, void *arg);

        int SSL_enable_ct(SSL *s, int validation_mode);
        int SSL_CTX_enable_ct(SSL_CTX *ctx, int validation_mode);
        int SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(SSL *s, ssl_ct_validation_cb callback,
                                           void *arg);
        int SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
                                               ssl_ct_validation_cb callback,
                                               void *arg);
        void SSL_disable_ct(SSL *s);
        void SSL_CTX_disable_ct(SSL_CTX *ctx);
        int SSL_ct_is_enabled(const SSL *s);
        int SSL_CTX_ct_is_enabled(const SSL_CTX *ctx);

DESCRIPTION
       SSL_enable_ct() and SSL_CTX_enable_ct() enable the processing of signed
       certificate timestamps (SCTs) either for a given SSL connection or for
       all connections that share the given SSL context, respectively.  This
       is accomplished by setting a built-in CT validation callback.  The
       behaviour of the callback is determined by the validation_mode
       argument, which can be either of SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE or
       SSL_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT as described below.

       If validation_mode is equal to SSL_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT, then in a full
       TLS handshake with the verification mode set to SSL_VERIFY_PEER, if the
       peer presents no valid SCTs the handshake will be aborted.  If the
       verification mode is SSL_VERIFY_NONE, the handshake will continue
       despite lack of valid SCTs.  However, in that case if the verification
       status before the built-in callback was X509_V_OK it will be set to
       X509_V_ERR_NO_VALID_SCTS after the callback.  Applications can call
       SSL_get_verify_result(3) to check the status at handshake completion,
       even after session resumption since the verification status is part of
       the saved session state.  See SSL_set_verify(3),
       <SSL_get_verify_result(3)>, SSL_session_reused(3).

       If validation_mode is equal to SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE, then the
       handshake continues, and the verification status is not modified,
       regardless of the validation status of any SCTs.  The application can
       still inspect the validation status of the SCTs at handshake
       completion.  Note that with session resumption there will not be any
       SCTs presented during the handshake.  Therefore, in applications that
       delay SCT policy enforcement until after handshake completion, such
       delayed SCT checks should only be performed when the session is not
       resumed.

       SSL_set_ct_validation_callback() and
       SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback() register a custom callback that
       may implement a different policy than either of the above.  This
       No callback will be invoked when the peer presents no certificate, e.g.
       by employing an anonymous (aNULL) cipher suite.  In that case the
       handshake continues as it would had no callback been requested.
       Callbacks are also not invoked when the peer certificate chain is
       invalid or validated via DANE-TA(2) or DANE-EE(3) TLSA records which
       use a private X.509 PKI, or no X.509 PKI at all, respectively.  Clients
       that require SCTs are expected to not have enabled any aNULL ciphers
       nor to have specified server verification via DANE-TA(2) or DANE-EE(3)
       TLSA records.

       SSL_disable_ct() and SSL_CTX_disable_ct() turn off CT processing,
       whether enabled via the built-in or the custom callbacks, by setting a
       NULL callback.  These may be implemented as macros.

       SSL_ct_is_enabled() and SSL_CTX_ct_is_enabled() return 1 if CT
       processing is enabled via either SSL_enable_ct() or a non-null custom
       callback, and 0 otherwise.

NOTES
       When SCT processing is enabled, OCSP stapling will be enabled. This is
       because one possible source of SCTs is the OCSP response from a server.

       The time returned by SSL_SESSION_get_time() will be used to evaluate
       whether any presented SCTs have timestamps that are in the future (and
       therefore invalid).

RESTRICTIONS
       Certificate Transparency validation cannot be enabled and so a callback
       cannot be set if a custom client extension handler has been registered
       to handle SCT extensions (TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp).

RETURN VALUES
       SSL_enable_ct(), SSL_CTX_enable_ct(),
       SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback() and
       SSL_set_ct_validation_callback() return 1 if the callback is
       successfully set.  They return 0 if an error occurs, e.g. a custom
       client extension handler has been setup to handle SCTs.

       SSL_disable_ct() and SSL_CTX_disable_ct() do not return a result.

       SSL_CTX_ct_is_enabled() and SSL_ct_is_enabled() return a 1 if a non-
       null CT validation callback is set, or 0 if no callback (or
       equivalently a NULL callback) is set.

SEE ALSO
       ssl(7), <SSL_get_verify_result(3)>, SSL_session_reused(3),
       SSL_set_verify(3), SSL_CTX_set_verify(3), SSL_SESSION_get_time(3)

COPYRIGHT
       Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

       Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
       this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
       in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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